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Abstract Disruptions to rail journeys are experienced by rail passengers on a daily basis 
throughout the world, with the impacts on passengers ranging from minimal to major. Such 
disruptions can be categorised as unplanned (e.g. extreme weather, vandalism, acciden-
tal damage to lines and power supplies etc.) or planned engineering-based disruptions. 
This paper focuses upon the latter, providing a valuable contribution to an area which is 
largely under researched, particularly in comparison to unplanned disruptions. Emphasis 
is placed upon understanding how passengers react to planned engineering-based disrup-
tions: do they continue their journey (using the modified service); use other stations or 
routes that are not affected; make the journey on another day; travel to another destina-
tion; or simply not make that journey. Consideration is also given to how being aware or 
unaware may impact on passenger behaviour and whether disruptions of this type have 
any long run impacts over and above the short run. Ultimately, passenger behaviour trans-
lates into what can be substantial financial impacts for rail operators. The paper considers 
this, with the development of choice models based on both revealed preference (RP) and 
stated intentions (SI) data from a large scale face-to-face survey of rail users (7000+) and 
a smaller online panel of rail and non-rail users (500). These are used to estimate demand 
impacts resulting from planned engineering-based disruptions. Some of the key findings to 
emerge include: (1) Bus replacement services for disrupted rail services are inferior to rail 
diversions, with around three times more rail demand lost with bus replacement than with 
rail diversion; (2) The level of awareness prior to arriving at the station does not seem to 
have a large impact on the pattern of behavioural response, this may reflect the increased 
information available from mobile devices; (3) There is some evidence to suggest that rail 
travellers see planned disruptions as a ‘fixed cost’; and (4) Guaranteed connections have a 
benefit, to the tune of around 9 min, whilst rail travellers have higher disutility from longer 
periods of disruption to the extent of around 22 min.
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 j.d.shires@its.leeds.ac.uk
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Introduction
Aims
Train services are from time to time disrupted due to essential engineering work under-
taken for the purposes of maintaining and upgrading the railway infrastructure. Whilst 
fairly uncommon on any specific route, they are routine across the rail network.
This paper reports research which investigated the extent to which various features of 
such planned engineering-based disruptions impact on rail demand, both at the time of the 
disruption and in the longer term, providing some original insights in an important area 
where there are few previous studies.1
The context
When engineering blockades occur, railway operators generally still have a responsibility 
to convey passengers and they can meet this obligation in one of two ways:
• A bus replacement is offered. This might be for the entire journey, involving extended 
journey times, or for part of the journey. The latter would additionally involve one 
or two transfers between bus and train depending upon where in the journey the bus 
replacement occurs.
• Trains are diverted via another route, make additional stops or are retimed, all extend-
ing travel times, or frequencies are reduced by cancelling some departures.
Bus replacement is usually an inferior option for both travellers and operators due to the 
higher incremental costs for each (e.g. interchange penalty for travellers and bus hire for 
operators). Unfortunately, bus replacement is inevitably the most common measure.
Many engineering blockades occur overnight and the rail travelling public is not even 
aware of them. Others impact upon late night and early morning services when very few 
are travelling. The vast majority of major engineering works occur on a Sunday with some 
covering the entire weekend. Nonetheless, disruptions can have extended periods, such as 
those stemming from route electrification or major station and track improvements. There 
is though, a tendency to avoid engineering works in periods when the rail network is more 
heavily used, such as weekdays, and to concentrate efforts over public holidays when fewer 
routine journeys are being made.
In contrast, unplanned disruptions associated with extreme weather, vandalism, acci-
dental damage to lines and power supplies, security issues, some forms of industrial 
action and indeed overrunning engineering work tend to be less common but extend over 
a prolonged period. Whilst inherently unpredictable, an unplanned disruption that has an 
1 This is perhaps surprising given that engineering-based disruptions have been, and will continue as, an 
intrinsic feature of railway operations and often cause significant disruption to passengers.
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ongoing impact essentially has the same features as a planned disruption once travellers 
become aware of it.2
There are a range of possible immediate behavioural responses to engineering-based 
disruptions. Those who are aware of the disruption in advance might continue with the 
planned rail journey, either using the modified service or else using other stations or routes 
that are not affected, make the journey on another day or travel to another destination. 
What does affect rail revenue is when rail travellers instead choose to travel by another 
mode or do not make the journey. Those who are unaware of the disruption can in principle 
exhibit each of the aforementioned immediate behavioural responses although they can be 
expected to be more constrained to the modified rail service and available alternative routes 
and stations.
It is worth noting that the responses described above relate to options faced by travel-
lers’ making non-rail journeys (Marsden et al. 2016b), for example when faced with a dis-
ruption to their travel or an activity a person must decide whether to: (1) continue with that 
journey/activity; (2) change their destination/activity; (3) continue with the same transport 
mode/route; (4) reschedule the journey activity; or (5) cancel the journey/activity. As such 
this paper positions itself within the general literature on disruption, not just rail.
Returning to the impact of planned engineering disruption, it is conceivable that there 
are also longer term demand impacts, for a number of reasons:
• Those who sample other modes or undertake other activities as a result of a disruption 
might indeed decide to continue with them even in the absence of disruptions.
• Experience or awareness of weekend engineering disruptions might instil a wariness 
that dissuades some from planning future weekend rail journeys.
• A bad or worse than expected experience during a disruption might increase the pro-
pensity to switch from rail on future disrupted journeys. This might particularly apply 
to those who were unaware of the planned disruptions beforehand.
• Prolonged disruptions might lead to high levels of frustration and dissatisfaction that 
induce a transfer from rail more generally.
• A poor experience may also be relayed to family, friends and peers, with potentially 
adverse influences on their likelihood to travel by rail.
Hence the longer term demand impacts might relate to specific ongoing journeys that were 
disrupted or to potential future rail travel more generally. Quantifying them is difficult and 
made more so by other background changes such as changing jobs, moving house etc.
Scope, contribution and structure
The scope of the research reported here was planned disruptions due to routine3 engineer-
ing works. It does not cover regular commuters since routine engineering works occur 
mostly at the weekend, commuters are hardly likely to switch out of rail in the long run in 
the event of anything other than major ongoing disruptions beyond the scope of this study, 
2 Although of course, and as we shall see, not all travellers are aware of planned disruptions.
3 By routine, we mean restricted to a single day or possibly a few days with the possibility of recurrence 
over a few weeks but excluding major planned disruptions such as prolonged station closures as a result of 
significant redevelopments.
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and, at least in the British context, season ticket holders are reimbursed in the event of 
planned disruptions.
The passenger demand forecasting handbook (PDFH) has, since its inception in 1986, 
contained an incremental forecasting framework and associated demand parameters that 
are recommended for use in the rail industry in Great Britain (ATOC 2013). It is a unique 
document amongst railway administrations worldwide. It is regularly updated with a syn-
thesis of best available evidence and since version 4 in 2002 has contained guidance for 
forecasting the impact of engineering work, initially informed by research reported by 
Steer Davies Gleave (1995) and with Steer Davies Gleave (2006) providing the most recent 
insights.
However, the PDFH evidence base is now a little dated and, as discussed in section 
“Background”, has a number of limitations which the research reported here aimed to 
address. Furthermore, there is very little published research on the impact of planned dis-
ruptions on rail demand.4,5 This investigation aimed to advance understanding in this area 
by exploring:
• the differential effects of bus replacements and rail diversions, and in the former case 
the impact of the amount of connection time and whether connections are guaranteed;
• the impact of awareness of planned disruptions, which will have increased over time;
• the effects of different lengths of disruption and of ongoing disruptions;
• whether the behavioural change estimates differ between reported responses to actual 
past disruptions and stated intentions regarding hypothetical future disruptions;
• how behavioural responses vary by flow type, distance and journey purpose;
• differences between the immediate impact and the longer term demand consequences 
of planned disruptions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section “Background” discusses why the research 
reported here is important and warranted. The methodology is set out in section “Meth-
odology”, distinguishing between immediate and long run impacts, whilst section “Data 
collection and key characteristics” discusses the surveys and the key features of the data 
collected. The analysis of the immediate behavioural responses is reported in section 
“Immediate impacts” followed by forecasting applications in section “Forecasting immedi-
ate run effects”. Section “Forecasting longer term demand impacts” deals with the longer 
term demand impacts with concluding remarks and recommendations provided in section 
“Conclusions”.
Background
We here discuss three important background issues. Firstly, we set out why the demand 
impact of engineering-based disruptions is a significant issue. Secondly, we review previ-
ous work in the area. Finally, given both its uniqueness and its relevance for the research 
4 This contrasts with what is now a large and growing body of evidence that addresses unplanned dis-
ruptions to rail services in the form of travel time variability (Wardman and Batley 2014). We note that 
major reviews of demand evidence (TRL et al. 2004; VTPI 2016) have nothing to say about the impacts of 
planned disruptions.
5 Note this journal paper draws upon a conference paper Shires et al. (2016a, b).
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reported here, we appraise the currently recommended PDFH method for forecasting the 
demand impacts of planned disruptions.
The significance
Engineering works often imply significant disruptions to rail travellers’ journeys in terms 
of extra in-vehicle time and uncertainty, the substitution of buses for trains and, in some 
cases, additional interchanges and connection time.6 Measures of the time inconvenience 
are calculated in Great Britain for the purposes of the Schedule 4 performance regime 
(RDG 2016), whereby train operators are compensated for the financial losses due to the 
infrastructure provider’s engineering-based disruptions. We are though unaware of detailed 
published data representing these time inconveniences.
Where there are dense rail networks, such as in the London area, rail diversions might 
involve as little as 10 min extra. However, congestion in urban areas coupled with multiple 
detours to serve the often numerous local stations en-route means that bus replacements 
can double or more the equivalent end-to-end train journey times.
As for longer journeys, consider the service between London and Cardiff (Wales), nor-
mally involving a time of around 2 h for the 145 mile trip. Diverting via Gloucester when 
the Severn Tunnel is closed for maintenance results in a journey of around 2 h 45 min. 
However, a bus replacement from Bristol Parkway would mean a 3 h journey, increasing to 
3 h 45 min if the bus shuttled between Bristol Parkway and Newport.7
If the main line is blocked around Swindon, the rail diversion via Bath leads to around a 
3 h 20 min journey and would be longer if the blockage was between London and Reading. 
The incremental effects of a bus replacement would be of the order of an hour, although 
larger if the parallel road was not a motorway and there were more intermediate stations to 
serve.
In addition, disruptions are of course not always single events. In the context of the 
previous example, Network Rail (2017a) announced major works between Bristol Parkway 
Table 1  Types of engineering based rail disruptions (October 2017)
a This is an average Sunday in October 2017, based upon 459 disruptions across 5 Sundays
b This is an average Saturday in October 2017, based upon 284 disruptions across 4 Saturdays
c This is an average weekday in October 2017, based upon 196 disruptions distributed between 16th and 
20th October 2017
Classification of rail service disruptions
Bus replacement Rail retimed Rail diversion Rail cancellation Rail extended Total
Sundaya 42 (46%) 10 (11%) 14 (16%) 21 (22%) 5 (5%) 92
Saturdayb 28 (40%) 11 (15%) 11 (15%) 17 (23%) 5 (7%) 71
Weekdayc 24 (62%) 4 (11%) 5 (14%) 4 (11%) 1 (3%) 39
6 With bus replacement, the requirement to interchange adds a ‘fixed’ penalty, the connection time is typi-
cally weighted twice in-vehicle time, and bus in-vehicle time is regarded to have a larger disutility than train 
in-vehicle time. These each add to the time inconvenience of planned disruptions served by bus replace-
ments.
7 Note these are elapsed times and do not include ‘fixed’ penalties for interchanges.
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and Cardiff in the summer and autumn of 2017 which involved an initial 4-week closure of 
the line with replacement bus services followed by 9 weekends of further disruptions.
Table 1 provides an illustrative example based on the number of different engineering-
based disruptions undertaken in October 2017, as reported by the Network Rail Enquiries 
Future Engineering Website (Network Rail 2017b).
Sunday disruptions exceed (by around 30%) those undertaken on a Saturday which in 
turn exceed (by around 80%) the number undertaken on weekdays. The table distinguishes 
bus replacements, retiming of rail services and reduced frequencies through cancellations 
to fit with operational constraints, rail diversions, and extended journey times as a result 
of making more station stops to cover withdrawn or reduced services. There is a strong 
tendency for fewer cancellations and bus replacements during the weekday compared with 
weekends, which reflects the operational preference to minimise disruption to the higher 
volume of passengers who travel midweek. It is also worth noting that a large number of 
the weekday disruptions occur late at night to further minimise disruption, whereas week-
end disruptions will often run throughout the day and evening.
Obtaining a national picture of the impact of engineering disruptions is difficult. How-
ever, Network Rail (2017c) do publish delay data on the causes of delays as part of their 
public performance measures. The figures for cancellations and significant lateness include 
disruptions from engineering works and in 2016/2017 stood at 3.8% of all English Train 
Operating Companies’ rail services. This is a substantive figure and whilst it is impossible 
to attribute accurately what level of cancellations and lateness is due to planned engineer-
ing disruption per se, it is likely to be a significant level.
Finally, the significance of planned disruptions is indicated by the considerable financial 
impact in the British context under the Schedule 4 performance regime. In 2015–2016, this 
amounted to £316 million compensation paid to train operators (Network Rail 2017d). To 
put this into context, around £1.5 billion was paid to Network Rail in 2015–2016 by train 
and freight operating companies in the form of fixed and variable charges to use the rail 
network.
Previous research
There is a long history in Great Britain, since the early 1980s, of conducting econometric 
analysis of sales data to determine the impact on rail demand of a wide range of variables. 
Moreover, the railways in Britain pioneered the use of market research methods to inform 
decision making. The considerable amount of econometric and market research evidence 
amassed since the 1970s is summarised in PDFH (ATOC 2013).
Despite the significance of planned disruptions, very little specific econometric analysis 
has been conducted. We are aware of studies that have examined the effects of shocks to 
the rail system stemming from industrial action, severe weather and flooding, landslips, 
and the consequences of the 2000 Hatfield rail crash (Glaister 1983; Owen and Phillips 
1987; Wardman and Clark 2001; NERA 2003; Wardman et  al. 2006; Wardman 2007; 
MVA Consultancy 2008, 2009; Nimako 2014). Nonetheless, these findings have very lim-
ited transferability to the impacts of planned disruptions.
As for econometric analysis focused specifically on planned disruptions, we are aware 
of just two studies. The most recent railway industry funded study (Steer Davies Gleave 
2006) was not a success, largely due to difficulties establishing what disruptions had 
occurred, and hence limited data, coupled with confounding effects with public holidays 
and large amounts of random error in the demand data. Nonetheless, Wardman and Clark 
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(2001) reported analysis of the impacts of the major redevelopment of Leeds station in 
1999. Using four-weekly ticket sales data over 10 years and for 166 movements, they were 
able to obtain statistically significant effects for 19 of the 21 dummy variables specified for 
weekend track possessions. Whilst indicating that the method has considerable promise, 
the results are not transferable.
An alternative approach is behavioural analysis based on purpose collected survey data. 
Indeed, recent years have witnessed an emerging body of evidence into how travellers 
accommodate disruptions into both their travel behaviour and wider lifestyles (Shires et al. 
2016a, b; Marsden et al. 2016a; Guiver 2011). However, this is not specifically related to 
rail or to planned disruptions.
Steer Davies Gleave (1995) was the first study to conduct detailed attitudinal and behav-
ioural research of large delays to rail services but it was not restricted to planned disrup-
tions. Nonetheless, it was the first to attempt to determine the long run impacts of delays, 
with rail travellers contacted using operators’ customer relations databases indicating that 
5% of future rail trips were lost as a result of large delays.
The only other directly relevant behavioural study covering planned rail disruptions of 
which we are aware is an unpublished report by Steer Davies Gleave (2006) funded by the 
rail industry. In addition to exploring factors that influenced awareness of the disruption 
and satisfaction with the replacement service, and the unsuccessful econometric analysis 
discussed above, the study investigated behavioural responses. The market research distin-
guished between those who were aware (53%) and unaware (47%) of the engineering pos-
session and used a blend of actual responses and stated intentions. It indicated that, overall, 
88% would still travel by train on the day, 6% would use a different route, 1% would travel 
on a different day and 5% would change mode or not travel. A limitation though is that 
the unaware are not allowed to have a behavioural response other than making the journey 
by the modified train service. This might explain why the proportion retained by rail in 
the event of what is generally a significant inconvenience would seem to be unrealistically 
large. The longer term impact of experiencing a possession was explored, with 6% stating 
that they would generally travel by train less, 6% avoiding travelling on Sundays and 13% 
avoiding travelling during engineering works.
Steer Davies Gleave (2006, p. 55) had intended to build their forecasting recommenda-
tions around the findings of the demand analysis. As a result of the latter being unsuccess-
ful, as discussed above, they stated that, “This has meant that our forecasting methodol-
ogy has had to fall back on arguing by analogy: if passengers know about the impact on 
their journey before they set off, then they will behave in the same way as for a timetable 
change, and if they do not know they will behave in the same way as if a normal journey 
had been delayed to the same degree”.
The PDFH forecasting procedure
PDFH’s forecasting procedure is based on the ‘by analogy’ recommendations of the Steer 
Davies Gleave (2006) study. These consist of:
• using industry standard time elasticities to determine the demand effects of the disrup-
tion timetable compared to the published timetable for those who are aware;
• using station/route choice models to determine the extent of switching to other stations 
or routes for those who are aware;
• treating those who are unaware of the disruption as if they had been confronted with an 
unplanned disruption and using industry standard procedures for forecasting reliability.
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The main limitations of this forecasting procedure are:
• We might expect the additional time incurred through a bus replacement to have a dif-
ferent impact to additional rail journey time.
• Using ‘analogous’ PDFH recommendations for the added time for those who are aware 
is not necessarily appropriate. Rail travellers may be more ‘accommodating’ because 
they appreciate that such disruptions are needed to maintain and improve the railways.
• In a similar vein, using the ‘analogous’ PDFH recommendations relating to unplanned 
lateness for those who are unaware as an estimate of the long term behavioural response 
would at the very least seem to warrant empirical justification. Planned disruptions are 
of an order of magnitude greater than the vast majority of unplanned disruptions and, 
moreover, might be deemed less unacceptable.
• The PDFH recommendations relating to the demand impacts of time variations are 
explicitly long run. These long run effects have been estimated to sustained changes in 
timetabled journey times rather than one-off or rare changes due to planned disruptions.
• Those deemed to be unaware are only allowed to exhibit effects through the unreliabil-
ity function yet clearly some will be able to amend their behaviour on the day.
• Longer term effects are not accommodated.
We should also point out that Transport for London’s long established Business Case 
Development Manual (Transport for London 2017), which most probably contains the 
most extensive set of parameters worldwide for use in the appraisal and forecasting of 
transport-related policy measures and investments, has nothing to say about the demand 
impacts of planned disruptions.
Methodology
We here discuss the methods we adopted for the two distinct forms of behavioural response 
where we wished to obtain a better understanding:
• The immediate impacts of specific engineering disruptions;
• The longer run impact of experienced disruptions.
The immediate impacts are expected to be larger, most likely appreciably so, and are 
easier to detect than the impact on future trips as a result of the experiences of specific 
disruptions.
These methods, as discussed in section “Data collection and key characteristics”, were 
implemented as part of both on-train surveys and an online panel survey. Surveys of rail 
travellers bring unique advantages over other methods (principally ticket sales analysis) for 
example: (1) greater clarity around the actual behavioural response and hence net revenue 
impact. Ticket sales analysis indicates a loss of a sales on an affected route but people 
could have bought a ticket for a different route/station/day which will not be identified in 
ticket sales data but is in the survey data; (2) distinctions in behavioural response due to 
journey purposes, something ticket sales cannot identify and which is useful for forecast-
ing purposes; and (3) clearly specified variations in the precise features of the engineering 
disruption are possible in the survey approach, e.g. the extra journey time, the amount of 
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connection time if the replacement was not for the entire journey, whether the connection 
was guaranteed etc.
Immediate impacts
We used two complementary survey based methods to establish how rail travellers respond 
in the short run to engineering based disruptions:
• Stated behavioural intentions (SI);
• Revealed preference (RP) in the forms of past behavioural responses.
SI: Stated behavioural intentions
The on-train survey asked what rail users would do in the event of an engineering based 
disruption on the day when they were travelling. Three bus replacement scenarios were 
offered which were characterised by:
• The extra journey time.
• The stations between which the bus replacement operated.
• The amount of connection time if the replacement was not for the entire journey.
• Whether the connection was guaranteed.
• Whether these arrangements would be in place for that day, three days or an entire 
week.
In addition, one rail diversion scenario was offered with an additional journey time. Per-
missible responses in both cases were:
• Travel on the replacement bus or diverted train.
• Use another undisrupted station(s).
• Use another undisrupted rail route.
• Travel by train on a different undisrupted day.
• Use a different means of transport, for one or both legs of the journey.
• Not make the journey at all.
The very nature of these exercises means that travellers can be treated as being in a state of 
awareness regarding the disruption.
The questions were customised to specific journeys for the purposes of realism. For 
example, we specified the stations between which the replacement bus would operate and 
we selected journeys where a rail diversion would be credible.
An online panel of the general public who had experienced a disruption to a non-com-
mute journey as a result of rail engineering works, regardless of whether or not they made 
the journey, were asked about a specific disrupted journey in the past 12 months. Those 
who had been unaware of the disruption were asked a behavioural intention question relat-
ing to their immediate response:
• Suppose you had been aware of the disruption before setting out, what would you have 
done?
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RP: Past behavioural responses
This involves respondents being asked to recall what they actually did when confronted 
with engineering-based disruptions.
Those intercepted making a train journey were asked about the last time they expe-
rienced rail engineering-based disruptions for journeys other than commuting. We 
explicitly stated that they may or may not have chosen to travel by the revised ser-
vice. Those who had experienced such a disruption were asked: how long ago it was; 
whether it was bus replacement or rail diversion, and if the former precisely where 
in the journey the bus replacement occurred; the journey time with and without the 
disruption; how many days the disruption covered, and the extent to which it was part 
of a series of ongoing disruptions; the journey purpose and frequency of making that 
journey; whether they were aware of the disruption prior to arriving at the station; and 
their behavioural response as set out above.
The same approach, relating to the last rail journey disrupted by engineering works, 
was adopted in the online panel survey of the general public.
The online panel survey also explored respondents’ broader experiences of disrup-
tions. Respondents were asked to consider all instances over the past 12 months where 
they had encountered an engineering-based disruption and to separately indicate the 
number of times they were:
• Aware of the disruption beforehand and still made the intended train journey.
• Unware of it beforehand and still made the intended train journey.
• Aware of the disruption and did not make the intended train journey.
• Unaware of it beforehand and did not make the intended train journey.
In all cases where they did not make the intended train journey, the alternative behav-
iour was identified in the same manner as for behavioural intentions.
Longer run impacts
Whilst we can ask rail travellers about the likely impacts on future behaviour of an 
engineering disruption, the responses could be surrounded by a large amount of uncer-
tainty and possible protest response. There are therefore attractions in an approach 
based upon recollection of past actual behavioural responses.
The longer run impacts were examined solely through the online panel survey, and 
covered disruptions over the past 12 months. Respondents were asked how these had 
impacted on their subsequent rail trip making. Permissible responses were:
• It has made no difference to the use of train.
• Less likely to travel by train for those journeys where an engineering disruption 
had been experienced.
• No longer travel by train for those journeys where an engineering disruption had 
been experienced.
• Less likely to travel by train for any journey.
• No longer make any journeys by train.
Transportation 
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Summary of methods
Table 2 provides a summary of the various forms of behavioural response explored, the 
method of doing so and the type of alternative service offered.
The behavioural intentions approach has the attraction that it is experimental in nature, 
and hence can control the precise details of disruptions offered for consideration. It can 
also ask what respondents would have done if events were different, such as if they had 
been aware of the disruption.
The drawbacks are that it relies on respondents on average providing unbiased esti-
mates of their collective behavioural responses yet we might expect an element of protest 
response. Moreover, by its very nature it places respondents in a position of perfect aware-
ness which would not be appropriate in forecasting given some will be unaware of the dis-
ruption prior to arriving at the station.
Recalling past behaviour has the considerable attraction of being based on what peo-
ple did do rather than on what they say they will do and admits unawareness. It would 
seem to be attractive in establishing longer run effects. Nonetheless, respondents do need 
to recall previous behaviour accurately, and they might still be incentivised to ‘moderate’ 
their responses in order to influence policy makers.
Data collection and key characteristics
We here describe the data collection process and summarise the key characteristics of the 
samples obtained.
On‑train surveys
The on-train surveys provided comprehensive coverage of all the PDFH flow types which 
consist of the London Travelcard Area, London and the South East, Long Distance to and 
from London, Long Distance Non-London, Short Distance Non-London, and Airport 
flows. Around 12,000 survey forms were distributed, largely on trains but with some at 
stations where trains would be very crowded. Just over 9000 were returned, with such a 
high response rate facilitated by most respondents being able to complete the questionnaire 
during their journey.
The final sample used was nearly 7000 spread across flows as indicated in Table  7 
below. We excluded those who had not completed key elements of the survey or who were 
out-of-scope. The latter were commuters and those whose train journeys were not covered 
by the questionnaire who had been inadvertently surveyed.
Online surveys
This was a panel survey of 500 respondents. After cleaning the data and removing those 
whose last reported disrupted journey was suspected to have been commuting, as it was 
made four or more times per week, we have a sample of 456. The sample aimed to be 
nationally representative.
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Key sample features
We here describe the key features of the on-train and online surveys and compare them 
with the corresponding figures obtained from the National Travel Survey (NTS). The NTS 
covers the whole of England and has been undertaken annually since 1988. Data for the 
NTS is collected from interviews with households and asking individuals to keep a 7 day 
trip diary. Around 16,000 individuals in 7000 households participate. Sampling for the 
NTS is based upon a stratified, clustered random sample (NatCen 2015) that provides a 
representative account of travel in England.
Table 3 indicates that the on-train survey was made up of 44% males and it was only 
slightly larger at 49% in the online survey. These compare well to the NTS figure of 50%.
The age distributions in Table 4 are well balanced for the on-train survey and are very 
much in line with the NTS evidence. The correspondence between the online and NTS 
distributions is weaker with what appears to be an over representation of the two oldest age 
group categories in the online survey. We might expect this, with an online survey, as such 
the discrepancy is not a major cause for concern.
Table 5 reports the distributions of the main occupations. The on-train survey fig-
ures are generally close to the NTS figures. Whilst there is a greater discrepancy for 
the online survey, notably in terms of a lower proportion of full time employed and a 
Table 3  Gender Gender On-train (%) Online (%) NTS (%)
Male 44 49 50
Female 56 51 50
Table 4  Age group Years On-train (%) Online (%) NTS (%)
16–24 22 14 19
25–34 23 15 20
35–44 16 16 20
45–59 22 30 23
60+ 16 25 17
Table 5  Main occupation Occupation On-train (%) Online (%) NTS (%)
Employed full time 53 42 50
Employed part time 9 15 13
Retired 12 18 13
Full time education 13 6 8
Carer 1 1 3
Unemployed 2 5 5
Part time education 1 1 0
Self-employed 8 8 8
Other 2 3 1
 Transportation
1 3
larger proportion of retired in the online sample, again this might be expected and the 
differences are not a major cause for concern.
The journey purpose distributions are provided in Table  6, which for the online 
panel are for the last trip. We again observe a generally close degree of correspond-
ence between the on-train and NTS samples, with visiting friends/relatives and social/
recreation/shopping trips having the largest shares. The online panel figures corre-
spond well with those for the NTS except, as might be expected, the former contains a 
smaller proportion of business travellers which is compensated by a larger proportion 
making social/recreation/shopping trips.
Table 7 reports the mean journey times for the on-train survey and also serves the 
useful purpose of indicating where the surveys were conducted and the sample sizes 
in each. The online survey did not provide such details. The sample sizes are skewed 
towards the longer journeys, where it is feasible for the questionnaire to be completed 
during the train journey, but all flow types have at least adequate sample sizes.
Table 6  Journey Purpose Categories On-Train (%) Online (%) NTS (%)
Employers business 16 6 18
Visiting friends/relatives 29 22 24
Personal business 5 13 9
Holiday/short break 20 14 13
Educational 5 4 10
Social/recreation/shopping 22 35 25
Other 3 6 –
Table 7  Mean journey time by flow type (on-train survey)
This table removes about 4% of the data because of missing or unreliable journey time data. Hence the % 
figures sum to 96%
PDFH flow type Flow Mean time Obs (%)
London TCA Shepperton branch to London 43 25 (0.4%)
Wimbledon to London 26 84 (1.3%)
Shenfield and Romford to London 44 80 (1.2%)
London and South East Oxford and North to London 91 724 (10.5%)
Portsmouth-Haslemere to London 120 468 (6.8%)
London Long West Yorkshire and Doncaster to London 157 1988 (28.9%)
Non-London Long Leeds and East to Manchester and West 128 1250 (18.2%)
Edinburgh and North to Newcastle and South 200 926 (13.5%)
Non-London Short Skipton-Shipley to Leeds 32 465 (7.1%)
Greenock-Paisley to Glasgow 69 265 (3.9%)
Motherwell to Glasgow 28 8 (0.1%)
Airports Leeds and East to Manchester Airport 115 276 (4.0%)
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Immediate impacts
In terms of the immediate impacts of engineering based disruptions, section “Behavioural 
responses to engineering disruptions” discusses some key descriptive statistics for the data 
we have collected whilst section “Modelling of the behavioural responses” reports on more 
formal modelling of that data.
Behavioural responses to engineering disruptions
Table  8 provides summary behavioural responses and included in it are the three key 
dimensions of bus replacement versus rail diversion, whether the respondent was aware or 
not, and stated intentions (SI) compared to revealed preference (RP).
The categories in Table 8 are: bus or divert, which are those remaining with rail either 
by choosing the replacement bus or rail diversion; station and route, covering those who 
stated that they would/did use another undisrupted station or route; and not train, which 
covers the mode switch and not travel options.
Comparing the performance of bus replacement and rail diversion for given data types 
and levels of awareness, the ratio of people choosing rail diversion relative to bus replace-
ment is 1.44 for the SI (rows 1 v 2) but averages close to 1 for the RP data (rows 3 v 5, 4 v 
6, 9 v 11, 10 v 12). However, these figures do not tell the whole story. Turning to the traffic 
lost to rail, the ratio of rail diversion to bus replacement is 0.66 in the SI data but somewhat 
lower at 0.42 in the RP data with not a great deal of variation across the four comparisons. 
This is clear evidence that, as expected, the loss of rail revenue would be greater when 
there is a bus replacement compared to rail diversion.
We would expect the proportion choosing the bus replacement or rail diversion to fall 
with awareness and this is indeed the case throughout (rows 3 v 4, 5 v 6, 7 v 8, 9 v 10, 11 v 
12) in the RP data which has to be used to examine awareness issues. However, the impact 
tends to be quite modest, and certainly challenges current PDFH recommendations that 
those who are unaware have no behavioural response at all. Moreover, the impact of aware-
ness on the proportion whose rail revenue would be lost is minor, moderated by increased 
switching to other routes and stations. On average, awareness increases the proportion 
choosing an alternative station by around 3%, the proportion choosing an alternative route 
by around 2% and the proportion not using rail by around 5%.
The largest impacts of awareness are when we bring in the SI data on what respondents 
would do if they had been aware and compare rows 13 and 10 and rows 14 and 12. How-
ever, the SI on what travellers would do if aware indicates a larger switch from rail than in 
the RP data for those aware. This might be expected since it is not uncommon that respond-
ents provide exaggerated responses to SI questions. It is to this we now turn.
Finally, we compare the RP and SI responses. This has to be done for the actual journey 
where the respondent was aware of the disruption since the SI question effectively places 
the respondent in a position of awareness. Rows 3 and 9 indicate 74 and 66% respectively 
choosing the bus replacement in an actual choice context, falling to 45% in the SI situation 
of row 1. On average 19.5% actually switched out of rail compared to 32% for the SI.
For the rail diversion, rows 5 and 11 indicate 69 and 67% staying with rail in the RP con-
text, little different to the 65% SI of Row 2. However, there is a much larger discrepancy 
between the proportions lost to rail which averages 9% for RP but 21% for SI. Whilst the dif-
ferent scenarios do not provide a controlled comparison, where only the type of data differs, 
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there is evidence that the SI data leads to an exaggerated response in terms of switching out of 
rail, with the same 12% difference for both bus replacement and rail diversion.
Modelling of the behavioural responses
Whilst tabulations are useful in giving a broad indication of how passengers might behave 
when faced with a planned engineering disruption, they are not able to explain in depth 
how behavioural responses might vary under different circumstances. To understand such 
responses, we estimated multinomial logit models on both the SI and RP data.
Model specification
The multinomial logit model (MNL) explains choices between the five alternatives to the 
modified rail option of bus replacement or rail diversion, namely another undisrupted sta-
tion, another undisrupted route, a different mode, a different day of travel and not making the 
journey at all. The MNL was chosen above models with more complex error term structures 
because the latter were unable to provide meaningful results with a high degree of observable 
heterogeneity, mainly linked to the presence in the data of six different types of corridors (i.e. 
PDFH flows) and six available choices per scenario, as we shall see below. It takes the form:
where  Ui denotes the utility of behavioural response i and  Pi is the probability of an indi-
vidual choosing alternative i.  Ui is related to relevant explanatory variables which for the 
SI data are:
• Alternative specific constants (ASCs) reflecting the inherent attractiveness of each 
behavioural response all else equal.
• Whether the disruption involved a rail diversion (TRAIN);
• The additional journey time (IVT) specified in the scenarios;
• The connection time (CONNECT);
• Whether the connection was guaranteed (GUAR);
• The disruption period in days (PERIOD);
• The ratings of how good the alternatives of different rail route (RATING_route), dif-
ferent rail station (RATING_stn), and making the journey by car or bus/coach (RAT-
ING_mode) would be on a scale of 1–10;
• Interaction effects stemming from standard PDFH flow types in particular but also jour-
ney purpose, journey length, frequency of travel, train operating company, day of travel 
and personal characteristics.
The ‘base’ utility for alternative i with the SI data is:
The terms that describe the disrupted scenario relate only to the modified rail option whilst 
the rating term applies to other stations, routes and modes. The ASCs are specified for all 
alternatives other than the modified rail option which serves as the arbitrary base.
Pi =
expUi
∑6
j=1
expUj
Ui = ASCi + 훽IVTiIVTi + 훽TiTRAINi + 훽CiCONNECTi
+ 훽PiPERIODi + 훽GiGUARi + 훽RiRATINGi
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The candidate explanatory variables for the RP data include the ASCs, IVT and TRAIN, 
along with any interaction effects, plus the impact of awareness of the disruption prior to 
arriving at the station (AWARE). The base utility function for any alternative with the RP 
data is:
Additionally, to account for observed heterogeneity, some of these parameters were esti-
mated separately for different segments (e.g. based on PDFH flow type), or a multiplier 
was added (e.g. purpose, day of week). With regard to the latter, and using the example 
of purpose segmentation for the IVT coefficient, we would specify instead of 훽IVTiIVTi the 
following:
where DEB is a dummy variable denoting an employer’s business trip and  multEB is a 
parameter to be estimated. DPURP_BASE is a dummy variable denoting all other purposes. 
Thus if  multEB turned out to be 1.3, then business travel would have an IVT coefficient 30% 
larger than for the base of leisure trips.
All the above attributes and interactions were explored in the estimated models and 
those that were significant or which we strongly felt merited inclusion in the final models 
are reported in Table 9. We estimated separate models to the RP and SI data given that, 
other than the ASCs, the extra journey time is the only common variable.
SI results
We discuss first the model estimated to the SI data. Separate coefficients within a model 
pooled across all the SI data were estimated to IVT for five flow types. These are specific 
to the bus replacement/rail diversion option and are all highly significant, denoting that 
as IVT increases then fewer will choose the bus replacement or rail diversion option. The 
larger ASCs for the shorter distance flows are presumably because of the greater attractive-
ness of alternative options for shorter trips, and hence greater sensitivity to time variations, 
whilst we might expect those travelling to airports to be more sensitive than those not.
Two multipliers were found to have a significant or almost significant effect on the sen-
sitivity to time. Business travellers (mult_IVT_EB) are, on average, 16% more sensitive to 
time variations whilst those travelling on a Sunday (mult_IVT_Sunday) are 7% less sensi-
tive. These effects seem sensible although we might have expected them to be larger in 
magnitude.
CONNECT is correct sign and highly significant, although with a lower coefficient than 
for IVT. It could be that respondents interpreted this as being part of the additional journey 
time and hence there is an element of it being an incremental effect. In contrast, GUAR is 
highly valued, equivalent to around 9 min on a long distance London journey. PERIOD 
has the correct sign, with an increase from 1 day to 1 week equivalent to around 22 min of 
extra time on a long distance London journey. Clearly, this is a large effect, and indicates 
that travellers are prepared to tolerate a one-off disruption but are much more averse to it 
being an ongoing event. Not all flow types had connection time and there was little vari-
ation in coefficients for this and guaranteed connections for those that did. The one incre-
mental effect that was significant was a multiplier for guaranteed connections for those 
travelling to airports (mult_GUAR_AIRPORT) where the valuation is around 2½ times 
larger.
Ui = ASCi + 훽IVTiIVTi + 훽TiTRAINi + 훽AiAWAREi
훽IVTi ∗
[
DPURP_BASE +
(
multEB ∗ DEB
)]
∗ IVTi
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Apart from some rating variables, which we shall return to, the remaining coefficients 
all relate to the ASCs. These were allowed to vary across all five flow types. Given there 
was no clear pattern amongst the ASCs that suggested combining by alternative or flow 
type, we kept the 25 ASCs separate. These indicate, all else equal, the extent to which 
alternatives to the modified rail journey are less attractive. As expected, not travelling or 
travelling on a different day are particularly unattractive options for airport users whilst the 
reverse is the case for travelling on a different day for long distance trips. Not making the 
journey is indicated to be a relatively attractive option for short distance trips which are 
routinely made and perhaps of lesser importance.
To select some examples, the ASC for not making a trip on short distance Non London 
flows is equivalent to 35 min of extra time and the ASC for using a different mode on a 
long distance London flow is 95 min, both for non-business trips not on a Sunday.
As is apparent from the results discussed in section “Behavioural responses to engi-
neering disruptions”, the option of a bus replacement is somewhat inferior to a diverted 
rail service. This was discerned in the estimated model. The best representation was to 
allow the ASCs to differ between bus replacement and rail diversion. These turned out 
to be very similar and hence a single multiplier term (mult_TRAIN_ASC) was estimated 
which applies to all ASCs. This indicates that the ASCs are 58% larger where rail diver-
sion is concerned, implying that all alternatives to the rail diversion would be less attractive 
than is the case with the bus replacement.
Finally, the rating coefficients (RATING_mode, RATING_stn and RATING_route) are 
based on the questions we asked as to how good it would be making the journey by car, 
bus/coach, another route or another station. This was on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 10 
(very good) and hence the coefficients to these variables should be positive, which they 
turned out to be. For the switch mode option, we used the better of the ratings supplied 
for car and bus. Where the respondent stated that an option was ‘not possible’, then it was 
made unavailable in the choice model. The rating coefficients are quite large relative to the 
ASCs, with a change of five points in the mode rating being around 25% of the ASCs for 
mode.
RP results
When compared to the SI results, the IVT8 coefficient is of a much smaller magnitude, 
suggesting the presence of more noise in the choices in relation to IVT. This makes sense 
since some travellers would have made their RP choices with less precise (ex-ante) knowl-
edge on the additional IVT they would actually experience and there may well have been 
errors in recollection. However, this explanation does not fit well with the very much better 
fit to the data in the RP model. Two other possible reasons as to why the RP IVT coeffi-
cient is lower are:
• The response to additional time in the SI exercise may be exaggerated, influenced by 
strategic bias. This is in line with the larger behavioural responses in the SI than RP 
data that was apparent in the discussion in section “Behavioural responses to engineer-
ing disruptions”.
8 The IVT coefficient in the RP model is not restricted to in-vehicle time since it will include connection 
time where there is interchange. This was not separately identified and the term is strictly here additional 
journey time.
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• There is a large ‘fixed cost’ associated with a planned disruption, such as stems from 
an annoyance of being disrupted, with the incremental effects of additional time being 
relatively unimportant.
Support for these arguments is provided by the RP model providing, as we shall see, more 
credible implied journey time elasticities.
There is no clear pattern in the RP ASC estimates when contrasted with the SI counter-
parts. However, we do observe a greater disutility associated with the option of not making 
the journey (ASC_notgo). This is reasonable since for SI choices a traveller might not have 
fully thought through and experienced the consequences of not travelling.
The RP model contains a number of statistically significant multipliers. Four of these 
relate to train (mult_TRAIN_ASC_stn&route, mult_TRAIN_ASC_day, mult_TRAIN_
ASC_notgo, and mult_TRAIN_ASC_mode) and three of the four indicate, as with the SI 
model, that the alternatives to the modified rail option are less attractive in the case of a rail 
diversion (compared with the case of a bus replacement). The exception here is that differ-
ent stations and routes are comparatively more attractive for the rail diversion option.
Finally, the ASCs are slightly lower for those who were aware (mult_AWARE_ASC) 
and also for those who stated that the disruption was part of an ongoing series of disrup-
tions (one of a few or one of many) (mult_ONGOING_ASC_day_notgo_mode) and these 
imply that the attractiveness of alternatives to the modified rail option is greater where 
there is awareness and where the disruption period is just a one-off.
Forecasting immediate run effects
We now use the estimated models to forecast the impacts of planned disruptions on rail 
demand. This takes two forms. We firstly compare the implied journey time elasticities 
with existing evidence. Secondly, we provide illustrative demand forecasts for a range of 
disruption contexts, using the RP model enhanced with insights from the SI model.
Implied journey time elasticities and existing evidence
Unlike the bus replacement, the rail diversion simply involves an increase in rail IVT. We 
can therefore obtain IVT elasticities that can be compared with other evidence.
Table 10  Implied IVT 
elasticities for 10% journey time 
increase—rail diversion
Flow type and data IVT elasticity
Stated intention
London TCA − 1.80
Non London Short − 1.38
London Long − 1.04
Non London Long − 1.08
Airport − 0.61
Revealed preference
Aware − 0.65
Unaware − 0.52
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The elasticity calculations are based on the models reported in Table  9 for a 10%9 
increase in the reported journey time for each respondent in our samples. Table 10 reports 
the implied IVT elasticities of the SI and RP models, split by flow type for the former and 
whether the respondent was aware or not for the latter. As is expected, the SI elasticities are 
larger, almost always by an appreciable amount.
We might argue that these are not long term responses but more like instantaneous 
effects, although the SI elasticities are free from the lack of information that contributes to 
short run elasticities being less than long run. The latter might explain some of the discrep-
ancy between the SI and RP implied elasticities.
It might also be argued that rail travellers are more accommodating of one-off or lim-
ited engineering based disruptions, since they accept that the infrastructure has to be main-
tained and ideally improved, whereupon the implied elasticities in Table 10 could be taken 
to be less than those estimated to sustained IVT variations as a result of timetable changes.
As for the empirical evidence against which these implied IVT elasticities can be com-
pared, Wardman (2012) provides the largest ever review and meta-analysis. It is focused 
upon UK evidence and its findings underpin PDFH recommendations. The estimated meta-
model implies IVT elasticities for static models, which form the vast majority of the rail 
evidence covered, ranging from − 0.46 to − 0.58 for trips of 10 and 25 miles respectively 
through to − 0.68, − 0.81 and − 0.96 for trips of 50, 100 and 200 miles respectively. Explic-
itly short run elasticities implied by the meta-model would be 40% of these values.
This review evidence provides a reasonable degree of support for the implied RP elas-
ticities in Table 10 but would indicate, as expected, that the SI data provides exaggerated 
demand responses.
Illustrative forecasts of the demand impacts of planned disruptions
When there are different sources of choice data, such as RP and SI, it is customary to esti-
mate joint models, allowing for scale differences and indeed for any clear differences in 
parameter estimates across the data sets.
In this context, we have few common variables and the forms of data seem to be tell-
ing different stories. The RP data might be expected to be more reliable, and indeed the 
implied journey time elasticities confirm this. Pooling the data and estimating a joint model 
does not therefore seem justified and our preference is to use the RP model in forecasting.
However, the RP model contains fewer policy sensitive variables and we recognise that 
the SI model does provide more detail that should ideally be exploited. We might therefore 
aim to enhance the RP model with evidence from the SI model.
We rule out the connection time coefficient in the SI model since it does not seem cred-
ible, although we note that the time term in the RP model will have contained elements of 
connection time. Whilst the SI model provides insights into guaranteed connections and 
the period of disruption, these cannot be readily adopted in the RP model because whether 
an interchange was required was not identified, let alone whether the connection was guar-
anteed, and the period of the disruption is also unknown.
This leaves the SI model’s rating terms that reflect the attractiveness of alternative sta-
tions, routes and modes that might be used to enhance the RP model.
9 We chose this proportion as broadly representative of the variation in IVT that underpins the econometric 
analysis of ticket sales data from which the vast majority of empirical evidence is obtained. The implied 
elasticities do not vary greatly for sensible variations around the 10% figure.
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The enhancement is based around allowing the ASCs of the RP model to vary with the 
rating of alternative travel options obtained from the SI model. Our main assumption is 
that the estimated RP ASCs relate to an average rating of the attractiveness of alternative 
options. We use the average ratings from the SI sample to input the SI rating coefficients 
into the RP model. Taking ASC_station as an example, we now assume the value from the 
RP model to be representative of an average rating of alternative stations. In the SI sample, 
the average rating of alternative stations is 4.82. Average ratings of alternative routes and 
alternative modes are 5.19 and 5.21 respectively. To retain the original RP forecasts and 
have these correspond with the average ratings, the RP ASCs are adjusted as follows10:
where RATING_x are the SI estimates for the Rating coefficients on alternative “x” 
and E(Rx) represent the average rating” in the SI sample. By subtracting the term 
RATING_x * E(Rx), the ASC_adjusted terms will equal the original ASC terms when rat-
ing = E(Rx). Hence, we can now use the estimated SI ratings together with the ASC terms 
of the RP model, such that:
where  Rx is the selected rating for the forecasts. The ASCxforecast is the ASC used for fore-
casting purposes, and will equal the original RP ASCx when the rating of alternative “x” 
equals E(Rx), i.e. the SI sample average.
Table 11 provides forecasts implied by the RP model for a range of disruption contexts, 
distinguishing by type of alternative service offered and awareness of disruption. Addition-
ally, we expand these forecasts using the SI estimates of the role of availability and quality 
of travel alternatives (station, route or mode) on passengers’ decisions.
We observe that there is not a great deal of difference between the aware and unaware 
respondents, which is in line with the results in Table 8. This is a challenge to existing 
forecasting recommendations, as we shall see, and is perhaps surprising. However, this is 
based on actual behavioural response to a past disruption and actual reported awareness, 
whereupon we would expect the responses to be reliable.
Whilst there is not a great deal of difference in the proportion who stay with rail between 
the bus replacement and a rail diversion, for a given amount of additional IVT, the propor-
tion lost to rail is around three times for the bus replacement and this is not surprising.
It can be seen that there is very little variation in the proportion choosing another station 
or route according to how good it is perceived to be. We would expect somewhat greater 
proportions than say 10–20% to choose an alternative station or route when it is deemed to 
be good, especially in the event of bus replacement. It seems therefore that our pragmatic 
attempt to handle the issue of the attractiveness of alternative stations and routes has not 
been successful and that the coefficients in the SI model are too low which may be because 
ASCstationadjusted = ASCstation − RATING_stn ∗ E
(
Rstation
)
ASCrouteadjusted = ASCroute − RATING_route ∗ E
(
Rroute
)
ASCmodeadjusted = ASCmode − RATING_mode ∗ E
(
Rmode
)
ASCxforecast = ASCxadjusted + RATING_x ∗ Rx
10 An underlying assumption is that the scale of ASCs in the RP and SI models is broadly consistent.
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of uncertainties in the ratings provided by respondents. This limits the transferability of the 
model in practice.
Forecasting longer term demand impacts
We have so far been concerned with what we have termed immediate impacts. We now 
turn to possible longer term effects of planned disruptions, the reasons for which were dis-
cussed in section “The context”. The impact of planned disruptions on subsequent behav-
iour was addressed in the online survey by asking what had been the subsequent effect of 
the previous 12 months’ experiences of disruptions. No distinction was made between bus 
replacement and rail diversion since it was not straightforward to do so.
Table 12  Categorical impact on future rail use
Made no difference 64%
Less likely to use rail where I have experienced an engineering disruption 18%
Less likely to travel by rail for any other journey 7%
No longer travel by rail for journeys where I have experienced an engineering disruption 4%
No longer travel by rail for any other journey 6%
Table 13  Assumptions underlying demand impacts
Trip rates Lost trip assumptions
Once or twice per week: 75 trips per year
About fortnightly: 26 trips per year
About monthly: 12 trips per year
5–10 times a year: 7.5 trips per year
2–4 times a year: 3 trips per year
About once per year: 1 trip per year
Less than once a year: 0.5 trips per year
Made no difference to my use of train: No effect on demand
I am less likely to travel by rail for those journeys where I have 
experienced an engineering disruption: either 25% or 50% 
demand reduction
I am less likely to travel by rail for any journey: either 25% or 
50% demand reduction
I no longer travel by rail for those journeys where I have expe-
rienced an engineering disruption: 100% demand reduction
I no longer travel by rail for any journey: 100% demand reduc-
tion
Table 14  Future demand impacts and the previous 12 months’ trips
Behaviour Indivs Base trips Disrupted trips Remaining trips
Made no difference 274 4833 4833
No longer travel by rail for any journey 27 504 0
Less likely to travel for disrupted journeys 76 1044 262 25% Loss = 979
50% Loss = 913
Less likely travel any journey 32 556 25% loss = 417
50% loss = 278
No longer travel by rail for disrupted journeys 18 316 46 270
Total 427 7253 25% loss = 6499
50% loss = 6294
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Table 12 reproduces the relevant categories and lists the numbers in each. The majority 
stated that the disruptions had made no difference to their rail trip making. As might be 
expected, the proportions stating a ‘less likely’ effect are larger than the proportions stating 
that they would ‘no longer’ make the journey by train, although the difference is slight for 
any other journey. The proportion who no longer travel by rail for other journeys may have 
been ‘confounded’ with those who rarely travel by rail and hence had not made a subse-
quent journey.
To translate the responses summarised in Table 12 into estimates of longer term impacts 
on rail demand, we need to account for the extent of rail trip making by each respond-
ent and convert the categorical behavioural responses into numerical variations in rail trip 
rates. Table 13 sets out the assumptions we have made on both accounts.
Table 14 reports the numbers in each category of respondent along with the base num-
ber of rail trips and, where needed, the number of trip for the specific disrupted rail jour-
ney. The demand impacts are not very sensitive to the assumptions made about the loss 
of traffic and result in an overall long term reduction in demand of 13%, assuming that 
less likely to travel is a 50% demand reduction, and a 10% reduction overall if the demand 
assumption is taken to be a 25% loss.
Some of our sample will have experienced more than one disruption, so the figures do 
not reflect the impacts of a single disruption. Nonetheless, most respondents had experi-
enced just one disruption in the previous year and the results will therefore indicate an 
upper bound to the longer term impact of a single disruption effect.
For passengers facing a rail diversion, an intuitive relationship could be advanced for 
differences between short and long run impacts. A comparison with Table 8 (lines 9–12) 
indicates that a long term demand effect of 10% is a little higher than the short term impact 
from passengers’ facing a rail diversion which they are aware of (8% loss of demand). This 
is also supported by Table  11, with a 7% loss for a rail diversion which passengers are 
aware of and the presence of ‘fair’ levels of alternative stations, routes and other modes. 
Where passengers are unaware, the short term impacts from rail diversions are, as would be 
expected, smaller, in the region of 5–7%. Taken as a whole, this would suggest that when 
faced with disruption, passengers identify alternative behaviours which then manifests as a 
moderate increasing reluctance to make rail journeys in the long term.
This cannot be said for passengers faced with a bus replacement where the short term 
impacts are larger, sometimes considerably so (e.g. 22%—line 9, Table 8), than the long 
term impact. Clearly, rail passengers have a strong aversion to bus replacement, as has been 
demonstrated throughout this paper. Why then would the long term impact reduce their 
reaction to bus replacement over time?
What does appear to be happening is that the long term impacts reflect the fact that 
planned disruptions manifest themselves in many forms (Table  1) and bus replacement 
appears to account for around 40% of these. We did not ask respondents what disruption 
they encountered when calculating long term impacts. As a result, the mix of disruptions 
and the different strength of responses combine to produce a long run overall impact that 
seems inherently sensible.
Conclusions
There is now a significant body of empirical evidence on how unplanned disruptions of a 
routine day-to-day nature, which generally cause modest variations in rail journey times, 
impact on the demand for rail travel (Wardman and Batley 2014). Indeed, the railway 
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industry in Great Britain has provided recommended forecasting methods in its Passenger 
Demand Forecasting Handbook (PDFH) since its inception in 1986, and this seems to be 
unique amongst railway administrations worldwide.
Planned disruptions are the focus of this paper. They are typically associated with 
engineering blockades and contrast with unplanned disruption in a number of important 
respects: planned disruptions involve significant increases in journey times; PDFH has only 
provided recommendations since version 4 in 2002 and then lacking in detail; and there is a 
dearth of empirical evidence on how planned disruptions impact rail demand.
Planned disruptions are an inevitable feature of railway operations, stemming from rou-
tine maintenance of the infrastructure through to major investments in station upgrades and 
route modernisation. As such, they can have significant impacts on rail travellers and, in 
the British context at least, are responsible for major financial transfers between operators 
and the infrastructure provider.
The research reported here is one of the most extensive examinations of the demand 
effects of planned disruptions to rail journeys and has provided important new insights into 
how planned disruptions impact on rail demand in an area where there is little previous 
evidence.
The study used a mixture of stated intentions (SI) methods, whereby survey respond-
ents stated how they would respond to hypothetical future disruptions, and revealed prefer-
ence (RP) methods, based around how survey respondents actually reacted to experienced 
disruptions. It also explored possible longer term impacts using RP methods, significant 
because it is widely regarded that what people state that they will do in the future is unre-
liable because of the uncertainties involved and the incentives to biased responses and 
because RP is rarely used to explore such effects.
The key findings of this study are:
• As might be expected, bus replacements are an inferior means of serving engineering-
based disruptions than rail diversions. A representative figure is that three times more 
rail demand is lost with bus replacement than with rail diversion. Standard industry 
procedures in Great Britain, in the form of the recommendations of the passenger 
demand forecasting handbook (PDFH), need to recognise this.
• The demand responses elicited using SI are somewhat larger than for RP and the time 
elasticities implied by the latter accord well with evidence obtained from econometric 
analysis of demand changes.
• Whilst there might be a view that engineering-based disruptions will have a lower jour-
ney time elasticity than equivalent timetable changes, on the grounds that the former 
might be deemed more acceptable given that rail infrastructure needs to be maintained, 
the evidence does not support this.
• The level of awareness prior to arriving at the station does not seem to have a large 
impact on the pattern of behavioural response. Whilst this might be regarded to be a 
challenging finding, we note that over time awareness has increased (potentially related 
to the ability to obtain information on ‘the go’ via mobile devices) and that the evi-
dence here is drawn from what rail travellers had reported that they had actually done 
in response to engineering-based disruptions. At the very least, our results would sug-
gest that the PDFH recommendation that there is no behavioural response from those 
who are unware is inappropriate.
• There is some evidence to suggest that rail travellers see planned disruptions as a ‘fixed 
cost’ and are not particularly sensitive to the amount of additional time when making 
their decisions.
Transportation 
1 3
• Guaranteed connections have a benefit, to the tune of around 9 min, whilst rail travel-
lers have higher disutility from longer periods of disruption to the extent of around 
22 min from moving from a daily to a weekly disruption over and above the additional 
journey time involved.
• The main choices seem to be between travelling by the modified service, albeit with a 
larger impact of bus replacement, and not travelling by the modified service.
• Credible longer term demand impacts have been obtained and this might be a function 
of being based on recollection of past experience rather than statement of likely future 
responses.
Whilst we have provided some new and important insights, further research in this area is 
clearly warranted.
Firstly, our attempts to address the issue of the attractiveness of other stations and routes 
were based on a survey based ratings, thereby avoiding the considerable resources involved 
in specifying in more direct quantitative terms the degree to which other stations and routes 
provide adequate substitutes. We have not been successful in this regard and it would seem 
that more detailed methods based around the relative generalised cost of different options 
is required.
Secondly, the issue of awareness seems critical. Our findings point to little difference 
between the behavioural responses of those who are aware and unaware. We have to rec-
ognise that awareness will increase over time, and hence that this will become less of an 
issue, but regardless of that further evidence is required that the behavioural responses of 
the aware and unaware are not greatly different.
Thirdly, we would contend that more monitoring work is required. Whilst our results 
are based on what people reported that they did, respondents might not recollect accurately 
their past behaviour and there remains an incentive for them to bias their responses in a 
strategic fashion in order to influence policy makers. Suitable monitoring of the conse-
quences of planned disruptions beyond the scope of this study would be valuable.
Finally, the acid test is the actual demand response as recorded in the sales of rail tickets. 
We had intended as part of this study to undertake econometric analysis of how planned 
disruptions had impacted on rail demand as recorded in ticket sales, given that the analysis 
of such secondary data has for many years provided important insights into the key influ-
ences on rail demand. Unfortunately, the requisite demand and disruption data could not be 
supplied to us within the timescales of this study but its availability would open up a host 
of modelling opportunities.
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